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Reconsidering Network Effect Theory
Tim Weitzel, Oliver Wendt, Falk v. Westarp
Institute of Information Systems
J. W. Goethe-University
Mertonstr. 17, 60054 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Telephone: + 49 69 798-28839, Fax: + 49 69 798-28585
{tweitzel|wendt|westarp}@wiwi.uni-frankfurt.de

Abstract- According to Network Effect literature network externalities lead to market failure due to Pareto-inferior coordination results. We show that the assumptions and simplifications
implicitly used for modeling standardization processes fail to
explain the real-world variety of diffusion courses in today’s
dynamic IT markets and derive requirements for a more general model of network effects. We argue that Agent-based Computational Economics provides a solid basis for meeting these
requirements by integrating evolutionary models from Game
Theory and Institutional Economics.

as the start-up problem (Rohlfs 1974, Oren/Smith 1981,
Katz/Shapiro 1985, 1994, Wiese 1990, Besen/Farell 1994,
Economides/Himmelberg 1995), market failure (Farrell/Saloner 1985, 1986, Katz/Shapiro 1986, 1992, 1994,
Gröhn 1999), instability (also called "tippiness") of network
effect markets (Arthur 1989, 1996, Besen/Farell 1994, Farrell/Saloner 1985, Katz/Shapiro 1994, Shapiro/Varian 1998),
and path dependency (David 1985, Arthur 1989, Besen/Farell
1994, Katz/Shapiro 1994, Liebowitz/Margolis 1995b).

I. INTRODUCTION: THE STATUS QUO

These models focus on individual buying decisions, marketing strategies of competing vendors, supply and demand
equilibria, and welfare implications. Common results are the
following:

It is common in many markets that the buying decision of
one consumer influences the decisions of others. Interdependencies such as the bandwagon, snob, and Veblen effect
are broadly discussed in economic literature (e.g. Leibenstein
1950, Ceci/Kain 1982). Besides these general effects applying to all the consumer decisions, some markets are determined by strong positive network effects, the so called demand-sided economies of scale, deriving from the need of
product compatibility. This means that the willingness to
adopt a product innovation correlates positively with the
number of existing adopters. Popular examples are the information technology and telecommunication markets. The
network effects in these markets mainly originate from two
different areas, the need for compatibility to exchange information or data and the need for complementary products and
services. Parallel with the growth of the telecommunication
and information technology markets in recent years, a new
area of research emerged aiming at explaining the phenomena of strong positive network effects in markets and their
implications on market coordination and efficiency. We will
refer to this research field as the theory of positive network
effects.
The primary goal of most traditional approaches is an
analysis of particular properties of modern information and
communication technologies, i.e. increasing returns to marginal adopters, or network effects (e.g. Farrell/Saloner 1985,
Katz/Shapiro 1985, Besen/Farrell 1994). Thus, the particularity of network effects lies in the fact that they are considered
to be characteristic of IT products and standards that are
therefore different in character from more traditional commodities and subject to different problems not as smoothly
solvable by markets (Katz/Shapiro 1985, Farrell/Saloner
1985, Arthur 1996). Various perspectives can be distinguished in the literature (Kleinemeyer 1998, Yang 1997).
Looking at empirical approaches authors mainly try to prove
the existence of network effects and estimate their values by
using regression analysis to estimate the hedonic price function of network effect goods (Hartmann/Teece 1990, Gandal
1994, Economides/Himmelberg 1995, Moch 1995, Brynjolfsson/Kemerer 1996, Gröhn 1999). Theoretical approaches
mostly use equilibrium analysis to explain phenomena such

•

In many cases, the existence of network effects leads
to Pareto-inferior results in markets.

•

Demand-sided positive network effects inhibit multiple equilibria and the market will finally lock-in to a
monopoly situation with one standard winning total
market share.

•

Instability is a typical characteristic describing the fact
that multiple, incompatible technologies can only seldom coexist and that the switch to a single, leading
standard can come suddenly, leaving some users
stranded with unsupported products.

•

The start-up problem prevents adoption even of superior products; excess inertia can occur as no actor is
willing to bear the overproportional risk of being the
first adopter of a standard.

•

On the other hand, excess momentum can occur, e.g. if
a sponsoring firm uses low prices in early periods of
diffusion to attract a critical mass of adopters.

•

In the case of sponsored technologies there is a possibility to internalize the otherwise more or less lost
network gains by strategic intertemporal pricing.
There are private incentives to providing networks that
can overcome inertia problems; still they do not guarantee social optimality per se.

•

The question arises if the laissez-faire of decentralized
markets should be replaced by centralized state control
to ensure favorable diffusion of technologies subject to
network effects.

While the traditional models greatly contributed to the understanding of a wide variety of particular (macroeconomic)
problems associated with the diffusion of standards, they fail
to explain the phenomenological variety of diffusion courses
in today’s dynamic information and communication technology markets. The examination of network effects is done in a
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rather general way, which does not cover the heterogeneous
properties of the markets with products such as digital television, cellular phones, office software, Internet browsers, or
EDI-solutions. Furthermore, the specific interaction of potential adopters within their personal socio-economical environment, and potential decentral coordination of network
efficiency are neglected. As a result, important phenomena of
modern network effect markets such as the coexistence of
different products despite strong network effects, the appearance of small but stable clusters of users of a certain solution
despite the fact that the competition dominates the rest of the
market, or the fact that strong players in communication
networks force other participants to use a certain solution can
not sufficiently be explained by the existing approaches.
Additionally, few approaches focus on the impact of increasingly important open standards [Gallaugher/Wang 1999].
In the remainder of this article, we will first systematically
reveal deficiencies in the models of positive network effects
by analyzing common assumptions and conclusions (section
2), before extending this criticism to the more general premises of the neo-classical framework (section 3). Based on our
findings we will identify areas of improvement proposing a
new approach to model markets with strong positive network
effects. The article ends with first results of simulations based
on our framework as a sound basis for further research.
II. COMMON DRAWBACKS IN TRADITIONAL NETWORK EFFECT
MODELS

In contrast to focussing on macroeconomic public policy
implications, our goal is to use and extend already elaborated
theoretical findings to support individual decision processes
associated with the diffusion of standards. We propose the
hypothesis that assumptions and simplifications implicitly
and uncritically used for modeling standardization problems
inevitably lead to the described results such as market failure
under network effects and that the analysis of the diffusion of
standards needs to be extended in order to descriptively capture real world phenomena and be actionable.
A

Direct vs. indirect network effects

Although the distinction between direct and indirect network effects (introduced by Katz/Shapiro 1985) is almost
commonplace in the introduction of articles about standards
there is very little consideration of these differences in the
models. But indirect network externalities have different
economic implications (Katz/Shapiro 1994). Empirical research shows that direct and indirect network effects are
evaluated differently by potential buyers and also depend on
the category of the network effect product (Westarp et al.
1999). Still, the distinction is not carried out in the models,
adding to the vagueness of their results.
B

Network effects versus network externalities

Liebowitz/Margolis (1994, 1995a) argue that not all network effects are externalities, in fact. Generally speaking, in
accordance with traditional literature on economics or externalities in particular, a network externality exists if market
participants fail to somehow internalize the impact of a new
network actor on others; with positive network externalities
the private value from another actor is smaller than the social
value, leading to networks smaller than efficient. Although an
individual standards adopting actor is not likely to internalize
his effect (from joining the network) on others, in owned

("sponsored")1 networks there is no essential obstacle to a
network owner internalizing these effects. Thus, the existence
of network effects does not necessarily imply market failure,
especially in the case of competing sponsored technologies.
Liebowitz/Margolis (1995a) show under what conditions the
profit maximizing network size is also socially optimal.
Katz/Shapiro (1986, 825) show problems of sponsored technologies when competing with unsponsored technologies and
second-mover advantages, i.e. advantage of one sponsored
technology that will be superior in the future over another.
Still, the proposed ubiquity of failing markets remains doubtful. Generally speaking, it appears to be difficult to find examples of inferior standards having prevailed over superior
ones, partly because of uncertainty of not pursued paths and
their results inherent to a not deterministic world and the
imperfect foresight of individuals (ex ante vs. ex post efficiency)2, and possibly because – in a world with potential
Schumpeterean entrepreneurs - there is no such situation. The
reason could be e.g. exhaustible networks effects and heterogeneous preferences and therefore parallel or equally desirable networks or the fact that most standards are somehow
supported by actors with patents, copyrights or other forms of
property rights. A similar argument can be made focussing on
satisficing instead of maximizing actors. Supposed the
QWERTY keyboard really is superior (see Liebowitz/Margolis 1990 for a critical discussion) the question
remains who benefits from being able to type 100 words a
minute when typing skills restrict one to a fraction of this.3
This argument somewhat resembles what Liebowitz/Margolis
call first-degree path dependence: There is a sensitivity to
early historic events but no implied inefficiency. And if,
therefore, different standards are equally beneficial after all,
“efficiency models cannot be expected to predict which of
several equally efficient possibilities will be chosen” (Liebowitz/Margolis 1995b).
The point made here is not the irrelevance of externalities but
rather to raise the question if standards really are that different in terms of economic implications from ‘traditional’
goods4 and to identify areas of improvement on modeling
diffusion processes of standards.
1
A quite commonly adopted terminology distinguishes between market-mediated diffusion processes of compatibility
standards (leading to de facto standards) and de jure standards resulting from either political (“committee”) or administrative procedures. De facto standards can either be sponsored (with certain actors holding property rights and the
capability to restrain the use of the standard) or unsponsored
(no actors with proprietary interests). David/Greenstein
(1990), S. 4.
2
This corresponds to what Liebowitz/Margolis call second-degree path dependence: Sensitive dependence on early
events may lead “to outcomes that are regrettable and costly
to change. They are not, however, inefficient in any meaningful sense, given the assumend limitations on knowledge”
(Liebowitz/Margolis 1995b).
3
“...the QWERTY keyboard appears to be fast enough for
almost all uses of it. If you are just driving around town you
do not need a 500 horsepower V8” (Poole 1997)
4
If this is the case - with network effects constituting particular instances of market failure – then and only then technology policies different from traditional industrial policies
should be considered.
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C

The bigger the better

The proposition of indefinitely increasing positive network
effects as described in the literature (e.g. Chou/Shy 1990,
Katz/Shapiro 1986, Farrell/Saloner 1992) implies natural
monopolies. If optimal networks under network externalities
are the size of the whole population (monopolies), all networks are too small. If network effects were exhaustible
multiple networks could coexist. Even though IT might be
less subject to physical limitations going together with the
law of diminishing returns, there might be organizational or
managerial problems restraining optimal network size (Radner 1992). Thus, the question raised by the existence of traditionally described network effects is not optimal network size
but optimal network since inferior standards could battle out
better ones. While Arthur (1989) proposes an example consisting of one technology that has greater value in earlier but
smaller in later diffusion stages leading - under increasing
returns - to (ex post) regrettable market outcomes Liebowitz/Margolis (1995a) argue that "synchronization effects"
are more likely uniform as there is no difference in the value
of one more user of videorecorder technology to others in
either a VHS or Beta network.
D

Homogeneous network effects

Another limiting assumption is that of similar and actorindependent valuation of networks and growth of network
effects. Heterogeneity of preferences can have substantial
impact on the evaluation of different competing networks as
well as on the value assigned to new actors. For example, a
close colleague of an engineer will add more value to the
engineer’s network than a sociologist from China. Another
example is VHS with compared to Beta possibly inferior
picture quality but longer recording times (Poole 1997, Liebowitz/Margolis 1990). Heterogeneous preferences increase
the chance of efficient coexistence of networks and overcome
natural monopoly tendencies. Good examples of asymmetric
partner contingent valuations of network effects can be found
between intra-group communications standards e.g. used in
corporate intranets between specialized professionals and the
inter-group communication standards within and outside that
same company. Thus, installed base effects cannot be generalized without regard to who is part of the personal network
and who else uses compatible technologies outside the usual
interaction scope of the respective individual.
E

Additionally, Poole (1997) describes institutional impacts
of corporate cultures and the associated path dependent properties on innovation diffusion using the failure of the steam
locomotive industry in the first half of the 20th century as an
example.
G

Normative Implications

Closely related to the problem of designing advantageous
coordination designs is the need for normative results.
Whether or not public intervention is necessary in network
effect markets is a common controversy in the literature.
Recommendations vary from centralized standard setting or
restriction of market power by the government on the one
hand side to total laissez-faire without intervention on the
other. Since network effects don’t stop at national borders,
the question arises whether public intervention might be out
dated. New emerging phenomena like the Internet show the
power of decentralized coordination while the basic implications of network effects remain the same. Despite this, approaches to improve decentralized coordination of standardization - especially in the context of particular groups of individuals, e.g. within enterprises - can not be found in the
traditional models. Finding advantageous coordination designs, efficient intermediaries and network specific cost and
incentive structures may lead the way to answer questions as
of the optimal network size, the trade-off between architectural (open) standards as XML and - based upon these - (proprietary) complementary technologies.
Thus, most traditional approaches towards diffusion processes of standards fail to properly consider costs and character of network effects and lack consideration of actor contingent knowledge and of institutional personal neighborhood
structures.

Costs of network size

If optimal networks under network externalities are monopolies, all networks are too small. This hypothesis only
holds under constant or falling (average) costs of adding new
members to a network. The costs of network size are ignored
in almost all models. Thus network effects are not sufficient
for natural monopoly and one single standard is not a compulsory social optimum. Instead, there can be optimal network sizes below the entire population and different standards can coexist.
F

decentrally coordinated networks (Westarp et al. 2000). In
contrast to the distinction between sponsored and unsponsored technologies, the institution of centralized control
within a hierarchy could coordinate dependencies due to
network effects even of non-proprietary standards. Additionally, autonomous actors could change their institutional
background by founding and submitting to a central authority
and therefore transform the problem of market failure to a
traditional agency problem, for example; this is basically how
the emergence of enterprises is explained in organization
theory.

Confusion of Centralized and Decentralized Decision
Making

Different instances of standardization problems are subject
to different institutional backgrounds. For example, in corporate intranets, there are - at least in principle - different possibilities of approaching strategic situations of interdependent
actors. Thus, we propose a distinction between centrally and

III. GENERAL DRAWBACKS OF THE NEO-CLASSICAL PARADIGM
Although individual utility maximization, as unanimously
agreed upon throughout the neoclassical paradigm, should
not be disputed here, the "Homo oeconomicus" comes with
further premises, the economic literature on network effects
quoted above implicitly assumes to hold. What these premises are and which one of them may default within an interdisciplinary context, will be discussed in the sequel.
However, if (and only if) all of these premises hold, then
the validity of the following two so-called "fundamental
theorems of welfare economics" (Hildenbrand 1976) can be
proven:
•

A competitive total equilibrium always represents a
Pareto optimal allocation of the total bundle of economic goods (a so-called Pareto optimum).
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•

ownership exists, permitting consumption only to a single individual. When common use or free duplication of
products is possible (as being the case for information
products like software), the equilibrium price is zero (if
there were no copyrights artificially restricting this duplication as an incentive to the producer).

For each realizable Pareto optimum a (positive) price
vector exists, for which this Pareto optimum represents a competitive equilibrium.

The goal of an economy thus is to reach a Pareto-optimal
allocation5 of goods. The ability of the market mechanism to
accomplish this task (more or less strongly) depends on the
following implicit assumptions:
•

•

Utility is drawn exclusively from consumption, i.e. the
destruction of resources. The temporary possession of a
good (like e.g. a piece of art or a game software), which
is sold to some other individual after some periods, cannot be evaluated in the utility function. When extending
the model to a multi-period economy, this inclusion becomes possible but immediately destroys the validity of
price coordination. Especially for information products
the neo-classical notion of “consumption” (together with
the exclusion principle mentioned above) poses a major
obstacle to market coordination.

Absence of Externalities:
In earlier definitions, an externality was considered to
be present whenever the utility function Ui(.) of some
economic agent i includes real variables whose values
are chosen by another economic agent j without particular attention to the welfare effect on i’s utility. As shown
by Coase, the market mechanism may overcome some of
these problems by adding “property rights” as tradable
goods to the economy. Therefore, nowadays an externality is said to be present whenever there is insufficient incentive for a potential market to be created for some
good and the non-existence of this market leads to a nonPareto-optimal equilibrium. So far, the absence of externalities is the only premise, network effect literature – as
discussed above – is trying to relax.

•

However, if not the consumption but the use of the resource comes to the center of attention, property rights
lose their additional potential of generating utility compared to usufruct rights. "Network Economics" of the Information Age has to migrate from a consumer-oriented
to a user-oriented discipline, in which the efficient solution of scheduling problems (which resources is used
when in which process?) will turn out to be a critical
success factor for an efficient creation of social welfare.

Complete rationality of the Homo oeconomicus:
Network effect literature often relies on the neoclassical assumption that all agents do not only know
their own action space and utility function but likewise
have a complete and realistic model of all the other
agents' current allocation, action spaces and utility functions as well! In a pure neo-classical "exchange economy" this assumption may be relaxed and even when we
only bargain with our direct neighbors the decentralized
exchange still leads to a unique and Pareto-optimal equilibrium, but unfortunately only if there are no network
externalities or indivisibilities (see below). But for
“realworld” individuals, parametric and strategic (or strategic and statistical (Williamson 1985)) uncertainty
(Hayek 1937) imposes constitutional bounds (Hayek
1994, 171) to the knowledge, their decisions can be
based upon. Additionally, heterogeneous institutional
and structural environments influence the decisions of
individual socio-economic actors.

•

•

5

An allocation x is considered to be Pareto-optimal if and
only if no other allocation y exists, which is weakly preferred
over x by all individuals and strongly preferred by at least
one individual.

Divisibility of resources
One of the most extensive restrictions certainly is the
neo-classical assumption of arbitrary divisibility of all
goods, i.e. each apple must be permitted to be cut into n
pieces, sold separately. What may be acceptable for the
apple, is impossible for screws or information. Interestingly enough, in defense of equilibrium theory it is argued, that the "rounding error" from unjustified acceptance of the divisibility assumption "washes out” for
large quantities. While this may be true with screws, the
argument breaks down at least for all goods, for which
the optimal quantity of an individual’s use is close to one
(e.g. automobiles, houses and all information goods).

Exclusion principle:
Prices only lead to Pareto-optimal collective action in
a multi-agent system if the exclusion principle applies to
the goods to be exchanged i.e. unique possession and

Separation of consumers and producers
The classification of the economic actors into consumers and producers turns out to be problematic in a world
replacing the classical notion of “work” more and more
by freelance activities, thus “mixing” both concepts. In a
“prosumer economics” we must not neglect the fact that
human work does “flow out of the power plug socket"
like energy but humans represent discrete renewable resource, whose entire economic and "recovery process"
must efficiently be synchronized with other individuals
of the network.

Therefore, research in the area of New Institutional
Economics (Hodgson 1993) rejects this concept of complete rationality in favor of a "learning" individual and
search-theoretical models of evolutionary systems. Equilibrium analysis models are replaced by models of the
evolution process of the examined multi-agent system, in
which the optimal action of actor i at time t is modeled as
function of his individual knowledge at this point in
time.
•

Consumption paradigm :

•

Concave Utility Functions / no complementarities
The preference orders of the consumers over the bundles of goods must be representable by (strictly) concave, continuous utility functions. How far this assumption misses reality becomes clear if we realize that this
does not allow for modeling complementary goods although complementarities can be found in all areas from
recipes (if one ingredient is not available in sufficient
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quantity, the cake cannot be baked) and service industries (if I’d like to spend a three weeks vacation on an island, the flights without the hotel are equally worthless
as the hotel without being able to book the flights) to information (if we do not know the concept of Pareto optimality and there is no definition provided, the fundamental theorems stated above are of no value to the
reader). This problem of complementarity is it, which
renders the “market solution” of scheduling problems
impossible: If a resource is needed for ten time slices in
sequence and the process is not preemptive (like with the
hotel stay), buying the ten time slices in separate auctions leaves me with too high a risk to end up with some
slices missing.
•

Absence of transaction costs
Neo-classical economics abstracts from transaction
costs, i.e. from costs, which are induced by the preparation or execution of the exchange process. In New Institutional Economics the effect of transaction costs is explicitly modeled and for example considered to be one
reason for the emergence of companies economizing on
transaction costs by being “islands of more centralized
control” in a decentralized market.
IV. TOWARDS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY THEORY OF NETWORK
EFFECTS

A

Required modeling power of an interdisciplinary
theory of network effects

After the critique of economic network effect theory and
the neo-classical paradigm in general the question arises,
which requirements have to be met by an interdisciplinary
theory of network effects, allowing to integrate and explain
social and economic interaction of human actors and automated agents (e.g. software agents trading at the stock exchange).
•

Modeling of knowledge and uncertainty / bounded
rationality

The network effect theory must allow for modeling
knowledge of individual participants (human or automated)
and uncertainty concerning this knowledge (in particular
concerning the behavior and knowledge of other participants
of the multi-actor system, we will call the “society” in the
sequel).
•

acting software agents can help to get empirical evidence for
such complex systems giving up complete rationality renders
the system of interactions to be “unsolvable” to an analytical
determination of equilibria and proof of their uniqueness.
Therefore, we must rather rely on simulation of system dynamics and analysis of the observed behavior of the simulation model
•

The approach should also be able to model the emergence
of new participants and their "death" in the evolution process
(to model for example the establishment or dissolution of
institutional participants) as well as the emergence and dissolution of new links between existing actors, i.e. allow for an
evolution of network structure.
•

While historic case arguments like the prominent
QWERTY example (Liebowitz/Margolis 1990) or the battle
for VCR standards (Liebowitz/Margolis 1994) proved to be
at least ambiguous6, numerical simulations based upon inter-

Abolishment of convexity and divisibility assumptions

Since many of the decisions to be modeled will be discrete
choice and exhibit interdependence to decisions made by
other actors, convexity and divisibility assumptions are totally inadequate and thus have to be dropped (which is less
problematic in a setting that has already given up all hope for
analytical solvability).
•

Economics of Intermediation

To overcome the lack of normative results from traditional
models, a new approach towards a theory of network effects
should consider institutional designs for managing network
related dependencies between individual network actors. In
this context, the role of intermediaries needs to be emphasized. Generally speaking, intermediaries can compile and/or
reallocate information necessary for coordinating dependencies between actors. Considering the uncertainties inherent to
novel technologies, intermediaries could contribute to solving
coordination problems associated with positive network effects. Quite contrary to the prominent hypothesis of disintermediation due to reduced transaction costs on markets, the
benefits associated with IT such as decreasing communication and information processing costs appear to be available
to intermediaries, as well. Thus, a new approach should integrate the analysis of intermediate coordination designs,
essential data requirements and associated incentives
problems for intermediaries to contribute to solving
dependency issues problematic for markets.
B

Evolutionary System Dynamics

However, since assuming bounded rationality usually implies the impossibility of determining analytical (ex ante)
results for an aggregated entity - such as a whole network
consisting of individually deciding agents - in terms of the
existence and/or efficiency of equilibria, a recourse towards
empirical and simulative approaches seems unavoidable.

Emergence of system components and links

Alternatives to a Neo-classical Theory of Network
Effects ?

As already stated above, New Institutional Economics explicitly addresses the emergence and function of institutions
and their change over time. Institutions are considered to be:
•

informal rules (habits) as boundary conditions on the
social behavior of the individuals

•

formal regulations (laws, property rights or contracts)

•

instruments for the enforcement of formal and informal
regulations

Although sharing much of our criticism, Institutional Economics often neglects the explicit modeling of any behavioral

6

Poole (1997) identifies another common misconception
when trying to identify winning inferior standards. He argues
that the often cited DOS vs. Macintosh example is different
from e.g. U.S. 110 volt 60 cycle AC vs. European 220 volt 50

cycle AC since the U.S. AC standard is stable and
DOS/WINTEL is still evolving.
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assumptions for the actors, and therefore neither analytical
nor simulative equilibrium models can be formulated and
used for answering the question, which institution is best
suited to achieve a given social goal. The evolutionary branch
of Game Theory (Aumann 1994) makes a valuable contribution to close this gap by mainly focusing on discrete interaction and making all behavioral assumptions explicit.
While most game-theoretical approaches still strive for
analytical solutions (and are thus restricted to very small
models) the research direction of Agent-based Computational
Economics (ACE) (Vriend 1996, 1999) rejects this goal for
being able to model more extensive multi-agent systems with
complex behavioral structure, based on a discrete (often distributed) “state-transition” system model. It should be undisputed through all disciplines, that the following "labeled state
transition system (LST)" as basic model of the real world
would not come with any serious restrictions of modeling
power:
In each state si ∈ STATES a subset of the society’s actors
is able to execute an action of type act which lets the system
change its state to sj . The transitions are labeled because they
do not only describe the transition from one state to another,
but additionally have to distinguish, which agent initiated this
transition. Formally, this may be modeled by LTRANSITIONS ⊆ STATES × ACTORS × ACTIONS ×
STATES.
If (for each participant) there exists a preference order over
all paths (chains of transitions) of this LST system, it becomes possible to not only compare different target states of
the systems but also to evaluate different paths of reaching
the same target. The social goal now is to find an institutional
setting that lets the LST system take a path which is Paretoefficient and maximizes or fulfills one or a set of postulated
“justice criteria”.
Unfortunately, an immense complexity problem results
from this introduction of path-dependent preferences. As a
compromise we may of course restrict ourselves to social
preference relations over the “outcome” of the process - in
those cases in which an equilibrium is reached - and only
analyze the impact of institutional settings on this equilibrium.
Of course, in such a general setting we might ask whether
all of the multi-actor networks of cooperating and competing
“players” should still be called “economies” or what criteria
of a multi-actor network game are necessary or sufficient to
call it an economic one. Although there seems to be no unanimity, a plausible criteria to distinguish a general social
game from the subclass of economic games could be “transferable utility”, presupposing that among other objects there
is at least one (common!) class of objects (e.g. money or
gold) having the property that the utility of every individual
(strictly monotonously) grows with the amount of endowment. For a game of chess or soccer this does not hold or at
least paying the other side for letting me win is considered
“against the rules”, i.e. breaks the institutional setting of
chess or soccer games. Once transferability is given, the
problem of finding the optimal action sequence can be separated from the distribution of the welfare (e.g. by taxation).
Note, however, that transferability of utility does not imply
by any means that the welfare maximization problem may
efficiently be solved by a decentralized market mechanism.

V. SIMULATION RESULTS
We developed a simulation model of an agent-based computational economy which addresses some of the important
requirements outlined above. So far, it should be seen as a
first step in the direction of evaluating and improving our
approach of an interdisciplinary theory of network effects
rather than a completed study. In the following we will only
present the basics of the model and the simulations results.
For a comprehensive description refer to Westarp/Wendt
(2000) and Wendt/Westarp (2000).
Our simulation is based on a simple model of the individual buying decision in network effect markets. A participant
buys a certain product exhibiting network effects whenever
the benefits (sum of stand-alone benefits and network effect
benefit; the latter depending on the number of other adopters
that are linked to this participant) are larger than the costs. In
case of competing products in a market, the consumer buys
the product with the maximum surplus if this exceeds 0. The
decision is discrete, meaning that it is not rational to buy or
use more than one unit of the same product or even of different products. This is an assumption which especially makes
sense for information goods like software or telecommunication products. The network effects in the utility function only
depend on decision behavior of the direct communication
network of the potential buyer. This assumption is confirmed
by empirical research in the software markets (Westarp et al.
1999) and also pays tribute to the bounded rationality of realworld actors. Therefore, in contrast to the installed base of
traditional models, we distinguish between relevant and irrelevant network effects.
All simulations are based on the simplifying assumption
that network structure, the consumers' preferences and the
prices of the network effect products are constant during the
diffusion process. All networks had a size of 1,000 consumers. We also tested our simulations for other network sizes
without significant difference in the general results. A total
number of 10,000 independent simulations were run until an
equilibrium was reached, each iteration of the respective run
showing one state of the network during the evolution process. To analyze the diffusion process the distribution of products reached in this equilibrium was then condensed into the
Herfindahl index used in industrial economics to measure
market concentration (e.g. Tirole 1993). All entities of our
model were implemented in JAVA 1.1 and their behavior
was simulated on a discrete event basis.
Our main hypothesis was that the (macro) dynamics of
network effect markets as multi-actor systems not only depends on the individual (micro) decisions of the participants
but also on personal neighborhood structures reflecting institutional patterns of networks. The influence of various determinants on the diffusion process of network effects goods
such as price, heterogeneity of preferences, and connectivity,
centrality, and topology of networks were tested. The results
strongly support our hypotheses.
•

The effects of cost and stand alone utility were analyzed by varying price and the heterogeneity of preferences. In high price markets we find more diversity
of products, due to the higher switching costs. We did
not find any significant dependency between heterogeneity and market concentration for close topolo-

search
7

gies , but a slight but significant negative correlation
for random topologies.
•

The influence of the networks topology on the diffusion of innovations in networks was proven. While the
close topology generally is the basis for a greater diversity of products (since clusters or groups of consumers may decide relatively independent from diffusion processes in the rest of the market), the random
topology tends to dominance of one or few products.

•

Intensity of communication (represented by connectivity) is the source of personal network exposure
within the diffusion process and is shown to have a
positive effect on equilibrium concentration.

•

Intra-group pressure positively correlates with closeness of the network’s topology and closeness is shown
to negatively correlate with concentration8, meaning
that although this pressure enforces group conformity,
it also inhibits inter-group conformity.

•

Opinion leadership has been simulated by centrality
and heterogeneity of node sizes (the latter was used to
represent the strength of influence on others). We find
a positive correlation between centrality and concentration, showing that some central participants can
significantly influence the diffusion process. Differences in power within the network did not have any
effect on concentration unless it was combined with
centrality.
VI. CONCLUSION

The increasing pace of advances in information and communication technology and the associated emphasis on compatibility standards constituting networks has brought diffusion processes of standards to a broad public and academic
attention. A common finding is the existence of network
effects, i.e. the increasing value of a network as the number
of its users increases (demand side economies of scale) leading in many cases to Pareto-inferior results of standardization
processes.
We propose the hypothesis that assumptions and simplifications implicitly and uncritically used for modeling standardization problems fail to explain the phenomenological
variety of diffusion courses in today's dynamic markets and
lead inevitably to the described results such as market failure
under network effects. In addition, the particular socioeconomical environment of interacting adopters is neglected.
We have shown methodological deficiencies of traditional
approaches concerning network effects. Together with a
7
The network topology is generated by either choosing the
c closest neighbors measured by euclidean distance (close
topology) or selecting c neighbors randomly from all n-1
possible neighbors (random topology).
8
As a direct measure of intra-group pressure we calculated
the „relative 2nd order radiality“, being the sum of the number
of indirect neighbors of each node divided by the hypothetical maximum of indirect neighbors (if there were no double
nominations by any direct neighbor). This measure positively
correlates (.405) with concentration, since a low value indicates strong intra-group links and thus resistance to outside
pressure.

critical examination of the neo-classical paradigm we propose
a requirements framework towards an interdisciplinary theory
of network effects.
An interdisciplinary network theory should incorporate,
among others, uncertainty and bounded rationality on behalf
of the deciding network actors as well as evolutionary system
dynamics, i.e. the emergence of new or the 'death' of existing
actors in an evolutionary process. The complexity resulting
from these propositions requires empirical methodologies and
simulation models in particular. As a first step towards extending theories in the proposed direction we developed a
model showing that the dynamics of networks do not only
depend on individual decisions but also on their personal
neighborhood structures reflecting institutional patterns.
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